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PANHANDLING AFTER  
MCCULLEN V. COAKLEY 
Cynthia Barmore* 
Laws restricting panhandling are exceptionally common across the country. 
States, municipalities, and courts have been struggling to discern their First 
Amendment implications, and a circuit split has emerged over content neutrality 
and the application of these laws to public streets and sidewalks. To answer the 
First Amendment questions these laws present, this Article divides them into two 
categories: those that prohibit all charitable solicitation, and those that prohibit 
only panhandling on behalf of oneself. It argues that the former are content neu-
tral, while the latter are viewpoint discriminatory. Panhandling laws that dis-
criminate on the basis of viewpoint fail wherever they are applied. For content-
neutral solicitation laws, the Court’s recent decision in McCullen v. Coakley 
changed how to think about their application on public streets and sidewalks, 
particularly when they create large buffer zones to prohibit solicitation near cer-
tain public places. This Article is the first to discuss what McCullen means for so-
licitation laws. It argues that the majority of solicitation laws now fail when ap-
plied in a traditional public forum, while they survive when applied in a limited 
public forum, nonpublic forum, or where there is a captive audience. 
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INTRODUCTION 
State legislatures and city councils have been cracking down on panhan-
dling, prompting a recent wave of litigation over panhandlers’ First Amend-
ment rights. There has been plenty to fight over. Panhandling laws are common 
across the country and take a variety of forms, sometimes banning all public 
solicitation for alms, while at other times restricting panhandling to particular 
places or times. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether the 
First Amendment covers panhandling. Every federal court of appeals to reach 
the question, however, agrees that it does,1 and an extensive academic literature 
developed during the 1990s generally supports them.2 Instead, the validity of 
                                                        
1  See Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222, 225 (4th Cir. 2015); Thayer v. City of Worces-
ter, 755 F.3d 60, 71 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015); Speet v. 
Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 2013); Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 
549, 555 (4th Cir. 2013); Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 
1999); Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993); see also ACLU of 
Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 788, 792–93 (9th Cir. 2006) (reiterating that “solic-
itation is a form of expression entitled to the same constitutional protections as traditional 
speech” in a challenge against a law that prohibited “beg[ging], solicit[ing] or plead[ing] . . . 
for the purpose of obtaining money . . . for oneself or another person or organization” in cer-
tain public areas of the city (alterations in original)). 
2  See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment 
and the Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896 (1991); Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue 
and the First Amendment: Are the Homeless Constitutional Castaways?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 255, 284–86 (1994); Stephen R. Munzer, Ellickson on “Chronic Misconduct” in Urban 
Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Bench Squatters, and Day Laborers, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 
42–45 (1997). But see, e.g., Fay Leoussis, The New Constitutional Right to Beg—Is Begging 
Really Protected Speech?, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 529 (1995) (setting forth New York 
City’s argument that “begging is not speech or expressive conduct protected by the First 
Amendment”); Peter Nichols, The Panhandler’s First Amendment Right: A Critique of Lop-
er v. N.Y.C. Police Department and Related Academic Commentary, 48 S.C. L. REV. 267, 
275–89 (1997); Robert Teir, Maintaining Safety and Civility in Public Spaces: A Constitu-
tional Approach to Aggressive Begging, 54 LA. L. REV. 285 (1993); Gregory S. Walston, 
Examining the Constitutional Implications of Begging Prohibitions in California, 20 
WHITTIER L. REV. 547, 557–65 (1999). 
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these laws turns primarily on whether they are valid time, place, and manner 
regulations—and the government often prevails.3 
The Court recently issued a decision in McCullen v. Coakley that changed 
how courts should think about these types of restrictions on public speech.4 The 
Court unanimously struck down a Massachusetts law maintaining buffer zones 
around abortion clinics as invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.5 That law made it a crime to stand on a public road or sidewalk 
within thirty-five feet of the entrance or driveway to any facility, except hospi-
tals, where abortions are performed.6 McCullen sharply cut back on the leeway 
given to states and municipalities to draw buffer zones prohibiting speech in 
certain public areas, and that decision carries profound implications for other 
types of speech that local and state governments often seek to regulate. Thanks 
to McCullen, certain solicitation ordinances now stand out as particularly vul-
nerable to attack on First Amendment grounds. 
This Article is the first to explore McCullen’s implications for panhandling 
laws, and it draws two key lessons from combining McCullen and the Court’s 
precedent on solicitation. First, panhandling is speech that receives full First 
Amendment coverage. Targeted panhandling laws are content-based laws that 
block speech on public streets, and if municipalities want to deter “aggressive 
panhandling” or fraud, they are limited to restricting intimidating or fraudulent 
behavior directly. Second, laws that prohibit all solicitation (including panhan-
dling) in most public areas cannot survive after McCullen. Even though general 
solicitation laws are content neutral, they cannot be applied wholesale to tradi-
tional public fora through buffer zones that cover public streets and sidewalks. 
In contrast, other solicitation laws that apply in a limited public forum, nonpub-
lic forum, or where there is a captive audience survive McCullen. 
This Article begins in Part I by surveying the current landscape of solicita-
tion and panhandling laws. Part II places these laws in the context of the 
Court’s precedent on solicitation, and explores the circuit split that has devel-
oped around First Amendment protections for panhandling. Part III combines 
the lessons of McCullen and the Court’s solicitation jurisprudence to conclude 
that the First Amendment covers panhandling, and that panhandling and solici-
tation laws that create buffer zones in public spaces are generally invalid. With 
the circuits divided and advocates calling for the Court to overturn these laws,7 
it is only a matter of time before the Court confronts McCullen’s implications 
for panhandling—a question with weighty implications for the nation’s poor, 
and one for which First Amendment doctrine now provides a clear answer. 
                                                        
3  See, e.g., Thayer, 755 F.3d at 71. 
4  134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
5  Id. at 2540–41. 
6  See id. at 2525. 
7  See, e.g., Thayer, 755 F.3d 60, petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 5211978 (U.S. Oct. 14, 
2014) (No. 14-428), vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015) (vacating for reconsider-
ation in light of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015)). 
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I.   SOLICITATION AND PANHANDLING LAWS 
For the purposes of this Article, it is first important to distinguish what so-
licitation and panhandling laws are not. They are not laws against obstructing 
public sidewalks.8 They are not concerned with regulating vendors who sell 
goods in public spaces, nor do they place restrictions on where the homeless 
may sleep. While these and similar laws carry profound implications for the 
poor and at times overlap with solicitation and panhandling restrictions,9 they 
do not implicate the same First Amendment questions as do laws that prohibit 
requesting charitable donations. Because they raise different issues, they are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
This Article considers the First Amendment implications of solicitation and 
panhandling ordinances that prevent the poor from requesting donations for 
themselves. As I define them, solicitation laws generally restrict the act of ask-
ing someone for money, while panhandling laws limit those requests specifical-
ly when made on behalf of oneself. Solicitation laws ban donation requests by 
any individual or organization for any purpose. Panhandling is a subset of so-
licitation, and laws that target panhandling discriminate among types of solici-
tation to ban only one kind. Both restrict panhandling in practice, but only the 
latter target panhandling. There are also important differences in scope within 
these two categories. Some laws prohibit solicitation throughout entire cities, 
while others apply only in designated places or during specific times of day.  
A central factor to keep in mind is where these laws apply. Many cover ar-
eas that have traditionally been open to the public for First Amendment activi-
ties. These are traditional public fora, and because they are historically im-
portant as places for the free exchange of ideas, courts are particularly skeptical 
of restrictions on public discourse there.10 For example, public streets,11 side-
walks,12 and parks13 are traditional public fora. Other laws restrict solicitation 
on government-owned property that is not as open to the public for First 
                                                        
8  See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90–91 (1965) (upholding ban 
on obstructing the street or sidewalk); Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(upholding ban on sitting or lying on sidewalks during daytime hours). 
9  See NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS & NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, A 
DREAM DENIED: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 9 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter A DREAM DENIED], http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/report.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/2PTW-8HJD]; NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE 
PLACE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 7–8 (2014) [hereinafter NO 
SAFE PLACE], http://www.nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place [http://perma.cc/MTZ5-
ZFYB]; see also Farida Ali, Limiting the Poor’s Right to Public Space: Criminalizing Home-
lessness in California, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 197, 211–16 (2014) (for a discus-
sion of criminal laws that target the homeless). 
10  See, e.g., McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529, 2535 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781 (1989)). 
11  See Ward, 491 U.S. at 796. 
12  See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). 
13  See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322 (2002). 
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Amendment purposes. For example, a state fairground is a limited public fo-
rum,14 while an airport is a nonpublic forum.15 While these laws still receive 
First Amendment scrutiny, the government has greater freedom to restrict 
speech in a limited public or nonpublic forum than it has in a traditional public 
forum.16 All of these laws create profound First Amendment questions, but for 
reasons explored in Part III, those that target panhandling and those that prohib-
it solicitation in traditional public fora are particularly problematic. 
A.   Solicitation Laws 
Laws regulating solicitation are exceptionally common. They place equiva-
lent restrictions on everyone who requests donations in public, whether those 
people are soliciting on behalf of organizations or themselves.17 Rather than 
regulate who can solicit by placing restrictions on certain groups or causes, the-
se laws regulate when, where, and how all people can solicit.18 Solicitation laws 
typically use general terminology to refer to the prohibited category of activity 
(“solicitation”) rather than words specific to certain subsets of that category 
(“panhandling” or “begging”).19 While it is not always clear whether a statute 
broadly prohibits solicitation or narrowly targets panhandling,20 the hallmark of 
                                                        
14  See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981). 
15  See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992). 
16  See, e.g., id. at 678–79; Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1357, 1359–60 (2001). 
17  See, e.g., FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 16, art. IV, § 16-82(b) 
(2012) (“It shall be unlawful to engage in the act or acts of panhandling, begging or solicita-
tion when either the solicitation or the person being solicited is located in [specified loca-
tions].”). 
18  See, e.g., id. 
19  Compare, e.g., AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-4-13 (2005) (prohibiting “solici-
tation” and defining “solicit” as “to request . . . an immediate donation . . . regardless of the 
solicitor’s purpose or intended use of the money”), with SANTA BARBARA, CAL., MUN. CODE 
§ 9.50.030(B) (2009) (prohibiting “Active Panhandling”). 
20  Sometimes cities define “panhandling” to include all solicitation, even though panhan-
dling is normally understood to prohibit only a certain type of solicitation, and courts inter-
preting these laws will face difficult interpretive questions about their intended scope. See, 
e.g., KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. I, § 50-8.5(b)(8) (2007) (“Panhandling 
means any verbal or non-verbal solicitation made in person upon any public street, sidewalk, 
alley, park or other public place, in which a person requests an immediate donation of any 
item of value, monetary or otherwise, from another person . . . .”); LONGVIEW, WASH., MUN. 
CODE § 9.23(4) (2008) (“ ‘Panhandling’ is any solicitation made in person, requesting an 
immediate donation of money or other thing of value.”); PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 602.02(a) (2005) (“Panhandling shall be defined as: Any personal solicitation 
made in a public place for an immediate donation of money or any other item of value. This 
definition applies equally to all persons requesting donations, whether the donation is in-
tended to be used for the panhandler’s personal use or on behalf of a religious group or 
community service organization or for any other reason.”). Some cities title their laws as 
“panhandling prohibitions,” but craft definitions that encompass all solicitation. See, e.g., 
MADISON, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 24.12(2) (2012) (prohibiting “procur[ing] a 
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a general solicitation law is that it does not discriminate among would-be so-
licitors or causes.21 Variations in solicitation laws relate to the time, place, and 
manner of prohibited activity.22 
Some cities prohibit solicitation broadly.23 These laws appear uncommon, 
and while they do not go so far as to ban all solicitation at all times—perhaps 
because the Supreme Court has indicated clearly that such laws would be un-
constitutional,24 or because cities have an interest in making sure local fire-
fighters can ask for donations25—some solicitation laws cover entire city areas. 
For example, Madison, Wisconsin has a blanket prohibition on solicitation an-
ywhere in its central business district and within twenty-five feet of crosswalks 
throughout the city.26 Springfield, Illinois likewise bans solicitation in its down-
town historic district,27 while Tampa prohibits downtown solicitation in an area 
defined to cover more than two square miles.28 Other cities ban solicitation in 
economically desirable areas where the concentration of people makes solicita-
                                                                                                                                 
handout,” defined as “to request from another person an immediate donation of money, 
goods or other gratuity, and includes but is not limited to seeking donations”). 
21  Compare AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-4-13 (prohibiting “solicitation” and 
defining “solicit” as “to request . . . an immediate donation . . . regardless of the solicitor’s 
purpose or intended use of the money”), with ST. LOUIS, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES 
§ 15.44.010(A)(1)–(3) (2008) (defining “panhandling” as “any solicitation in person, by a 
person, other than a charitable organization, for an immediate grant of money” and defining 
“charitable organization” as “any nonprofit community organization, fraternal, benevolent, 
educational, philanthropic, or service organization, or governmental employee organization, 
which solicits or obtains contributions solicited from the public for charitable purposes”). 
22  See infra notes 25–48. 
23  See infra notes 26–28. 
24  See, e.g., Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 639 (1980). 
25  See, e.g., Panhandling Ban Hits Firefighters’ Fill the Boot Fundraiser, 
THEDENVERCHANNEL.COM (Feb. 28, 2007, 5:52 AM), http://www.thedenverchannel.com/n 
ews/panhandling-ban-hits-firefighters-fill-the-boot-fundraiser [http://perma.cc/QY3T-HTM 
U]. 
26  MADISON, WIS., CODE § 24.12(2) (prohibiting “procur[ing] a handout,” defined as “to re-
quest from another person an immediate donation of money, goods or other gratuity, and in-
cludes but is not limited to seeking donations”). 
27  SPRINGFIELD, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 13, § 131.06(a)(3) (2007). 
28  TAMPA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 14, art. II, div. 2, § 14-46(c)(2) (2013). 
“Downtown/Ybor Area Prohibited Zone” means that land area bounded on the north by West 
Palm Avenue (to the northern edge of pavement), bounded on the west by North Boulevard (to 
the western edge of pavement) until North Boulevard crosses the Hillsborough River, then by 
the Hillsborough River (to the water’s edge), bounded on the south by Garrison Channel (to the 
water’s edge), and bounded by the east by Ybor Channel (to the water’s edge) as far north as E. 
Harbor Street (the northern edge of pavement) then west until the eastern edge of pavement of 
N. 14th Street, then north until the southern edge of pavement of Adamo Dr., then east until the 
eastern edge of 26th Street bounded on the east by 26th Street (to the eastern edge of pavement) 
(see graphic map attached as Exhibit “A.”). 
Id. Interested readers can view the graphic map in Exhibit A at 
http://www.tampagov.net/sites/default/files/special-events-coordination/files/ordinance_201 
3-95_solicitation.pdf, or create a similar graphic by manually inputting the listed parameters 
at http://www.mapdevelopers.com/area_finder.php. 
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tion particularly profitable, such as public parks,29 boardwalks,30 and beaches.31 
Some cities require permits for any type of solicitation, be it charitable, reli-
gious, educational, or otherwise.32 Others require all solicitors to register with 
the city before engaging in solicitation.33 
In contrast, other cities place more limited restrictions on solicitation. Aus-
tin, Texas has a law against “aggressive solicitation” that illustrates a common 
approach to time, place, and manner restrictions in traditional public fora.34 
First, Austin’s time restriction prohibits solicitation in its downtown business 
district between 7:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.35 Second, its place restrictions prohibit 
solicitation at marked crosswalks, on streets where certain schools are located, 
at outdoor dining establishments, and within twenty-five feet of an ATM or 
bank entrance.36 Finally, its manner restrictions prohibit solicitation when done 
by touching, intimidating, following, blocking, or using obscene language or 
gestures directed at the person solicited.37 
Other cities place similar restrictions on solicitation in limited public or 
nonpublic fora. For example, Los Angeles bans solicitation at its major air-
port,38 while New York City prohibits solicitation on the subway.39 Austin 
likewise prohibits solicitation at bus stops or on public transportation.40 Other 
cities have “Green River Ordinances” that ban solicitation at private residences 
under certain circumstances, such as during nighttime hours41 or in the presence 
of a “No Solicitation” sign.42  
                                                        
29  See, e.g., FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 16, art. IV, § 16-82(b)(5) 
(2012). 
30  See, e.g., MADEIRA BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 58-97 (2007). 
31  See, e.g., SARASOTA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 23-7(a) (2013) (“It shall be unlawful 
to engage in an act of panhandling when either the panhandler or the person being solicited 
is located at . . . a public park, beach, fairground, or sporting facility, including entryways or 
exits thereto . . . .”); see also DEERFIELD BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 46-34(d)(13) 
(2012). 
32  See, e.g., MEMPHIS, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 6-64-3 (1985). Memphis also prohib-
its certain types of panhandling specifically, in addition to solicitation generally. See id. 
§§ 6-56-1 to -9 (2010). 
33  See, e.g., ROGERS, ARK., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 38-22 (1997). 
34  See AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-4-13 (2005). 
35  Id. § 9-4-13(C)(7). 
36  Id. § 9-4-13(C)(3)–(6). 
37  Id. § 9-4-13(B)(1), (C)(1). 
38  L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 171.02(c) (2000); see Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness of 
Cal., Inc. v. City of L.A., 764 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding ban on solicitation 
at LAX). 
39  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6(b)–(c) (2005); see Young v. N.Y.C. 
Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 148–49 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding New York City’s ban on so-
licitation on subway cars). 
40  AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-4-13(C)(2) (2005). 
41  See, e.g., GREEN RIVER, WYO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 20-5 (2013). 
42  See id. § 20-1. 
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A common variation on place restrictions is to create buffer zones around 
certain areas that cities believe entail a risk of coercion or intimidation. Cleve-
land’s law against “aggressive solicitation” is illustrative. Cleveland bans all 
solicitation within twenty feet of an ATM, bus stop, people waiting in line, 
sidewalk cafe, or valet, within fifteen feet of public toilets, and within ten feet 
of a building or parking lot entrance.43 Pittsburgh likewise bans solicitation “at 
locations or times deemed particularly threatening and dangerous,” including 
within twenty-five feet of an outdoor eating establishment, admission line, en-
trance to a religious building, or ATM, or within ten feet of a food vendor or 
bus stop.44 Springfield, Missouri goes even further. Its buffer zones effectively 
span its downtown area, banning solicitation within twenty feet of any office 
building, store, bank, home, or outdoor dining area, and within five feet of any 
curb or sidewalk.45 
In addition to restricting where solicitation takes place, cities commonly 
impose time restrictions, particularly bans on nighttime solicitation.46 Time re-
strictions also can overlap with place or manner restrictions, with nighttime so-
licitation prohibited only in certain places or when combined with certain tech-
niques. Albuquerque, for example, prohibits nighttime solicitation only in 
certain downtown areas.47 In contrast, Chapel Hill prohibits nighttime solicita-
tion only if done through verbal or “direct written” appeal,48 but allows passive 
nighttime solicitation, such as by holding a sign or leaving a guitar case open 
while performing.49 
B.   Panhandling Laws 
Rather than ban all solicitation, some cities prohibit only “panhandling” or 
“begging” as a type of solicitation. Cities have targeted panhandlers for centu-
ries,50 and anti-begging laws in the United States date to the eighteenth centu-
ry.51 Today, panhandling ordinances are on the books in an estimated 76 per-
cent of cities across the country.52 They are also becoming more common. 
                                                        
43  CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 605.031(b) (2006). 
44  PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 602.01–.04 (2014). 
45  SPRINGFIELD, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. I, § 78-2(c)–(d) (2014). 
46  See, e.g., AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-4-13(C)(7) (2005). 
47  ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-2-28(D)(1) (2004). 
48  CHAPEL HILL, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. XVII, § 11-170(f) (2003). 
49  See Memorandum from W. Calvin Horton, Town Manager, & Ralph Karpinos, Town At-
torney, to Mayor and Town Council of Chapel Hill, NC (Mar. 3, 2003) 
http://townhall.townofchapelhill.org/archives/agendas/ca030303/7-solicitation%20item.htm. 
50  See Teir, supra note 2, at 294–300. 
51  See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhan-
dlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1202–19 (1996) (“Plato 
urged the banishment of beggars; John Locke favored whipping panhandlers under age four-
teen and sentencing older ones to hard labor; Karl Marx was famously scornful of the lump-
enproletariat.” (footnotes omitted)); Leoussis, supra note 2, at 543. 
52  NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 9, at 17, 20 (relying on a 2014 study of 187 U.S. cities). 
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From 2002 to 2005, prohibitions on panhandling in certain public places in-
creased 12 percent, while prohibitions on aggressive panhandling rose 18 per-
cent.53 The prevalence of the former increased another 20 percent from 2011 to 
2014.54 Whether large or small, affluent or struggling, or on one coast or the 
other, states and municipalities often pass laws prohibiting panhandling to 
some degree.55 
Not all cities define panhandling or begging, but their ordinary meaning is 
the solicitation of alms on behalf of oneself.56 What exactly, however, is being 
prohibited when cities ban “panhandling” or “begging” as opposed to solicita-
tion generally? Are people forbidden only from verbally asking for money, or 
also from holding a sign requesting donations? What about playing music with 
a nearby jar for change? The answer depends on the city. Some cities prohibit 
all solicitation of alms, while others ban only certain types of panhandling.  
There is a common distinction between “active” panhandling, such as ver-
bally asking for money or otherwise directly engaging with the listener, and 
“passive” panhandling, such as holding a sign requesting donations.57 Santa 
Barbara, for example, prohibits only verbal requests for donations in certain 
places, but not passive displays of signs requesting money.58 In contrast, Myrtle 
Beach defines panhandling far more broadly as “aggressive or nonaggressive 
solicitation” that can be “verbal or nonverbal,” such as by singing, street per-
forming, or giving an item of little or no monetary value.59  
As with general solicitation laws, there are important differences in where 
panhandling laws apply within cities. The broadest laws prohibit panhandling 
across entire cities. For example, New Orleans makes “begging” a crime any-
where in the city,60 and Duluth, Minnesota bans public solicitation for money 
except when done by a charitable organization.61 Savannah, Georgia similarly 
bans “begging” or solicitation on one’s own behalf at any business, house, or 
on any city street.62 A 2014 national study found that 24 percent of cities ban all 
panhandling, a 25 percent increase from 2011 to 2014.63 On the other end of the 
                                                        
53  A DREAM DENIED, supra note 9, at 9 (relying on a 2006 study of 224 U.S. cities). 
54  NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 9, at 17, 20 (relying on a 2014 study of 187 U.S. cities). 
55  See A DREAM DENIED, supra note 9, at 9. 
56  See Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 873–74 (6th Cir. 2013) (defining “begging” accord-
ing to the “standard dictionary definition” of “soliciting alms,” despite lack of definition in 
Michigan statute). 
57  See, e.g., KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. I, § 50-8.5(c)(4) (2007) (prohibit-
ing only active panhandling within certain downtown areas and prohibiting active and pas-
sive panhandling within 20 feet of any outdoor dining establishment or the entrance of any 
office building, business, bank, or home). 
58  SANTA BARBARA, CAL., CODE §§ 9.50.020(A), 9.50.030(B) (2009) (prohibiting active 
panhandling, but not passive panhandling, in certain public areas). 
59  MYRTLE BEACH, S.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. XI, div. 1, § 14-301 (2013). 
60  NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. VI, div. 4, §§ 54-411, 54-412 (2011). 
61  DULUTH, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 34-31 (1979). 
62  SAVANNAH, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-1001 (1977). 
63  NO SAFE PLACE, supra note 9, at 18, 20 (relying on a 2014 study of 187 U.S. cities). 
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spectrum, some cities outlaw panhandling in a harassing or aggressive manner, 
and 45 percent of cities surveyed in 2005 had such laws.64 Others fall in the 
middle, outlawing panhandling in particular places or at certain times. In 2005, 
43 percent of surveyed cities had these types of restrictions.65 
The distinction between these latter two categories—forbidding “aggres-
sive” panhandling on the one hand, and restricting panhandling in certain plac-
es on the other—has been collapsing. There is an increasing trend among cities 
to frame panhandling laws as bans on aggressive panhandling, defined to in-
clude the manner and context of solicitation.66 Many restrictions do target ag-
gressive behavior (the manner of solicitation).67 Others target when or where 
panhandling occurs (its context), even absent conduct that is, in fact, aggres-
sive, under the rationale that panhandling in certain locations or at certain times 
is inherently threatening.68 Many panhandling laws, like general solicitation or-
dinances, include both manner and context restrictions.  
The panhandling ordinance of St. Louis, Missouri is illustrative.69 Its law, 
entitled “Aggressive Begging,” includes five manner prohibitions and eleven 
context prohibitions.70 The manner prohibitions forbid (1) threatening or intim-
idating the person solicited, (2) persisting in panhandling after a denial, (3) 
blocking someone’s path, (4) touching that person, or (5) washing car windows 
or performing a similar service without permission and then asking for mon-
ey.71 In contrast, St. Louis’s context prohibitions forbid panhandling (1) in a 
public transportation vehicle, (2) within fifty feet of an ATM, bank entrance, or 
school, (3) within thirty feet of a public building entrance, including businesses, 
(4) at sidewalk cafes, (5) at bus stops, train stops, or taxi stands, (6) within 
twenty feet of crosswalks, (7) in government buildings, (8) at public parks, golf 
courses, or playgrounds, (9) on private property without permission, (10) at 
nighttime, or (11) in a group of two or more people.72 
Context restrictions thus focus on the time and location of panhandling. 
Some laws like St. Louis’s define “aggressive panhandling” broadly to create 
large panhandling buffer zones around certain public places.73 As with solicita-
tion laws, these buffer zones sometimes blanket downtown districts or econom-
ically desirable areas, creating wide swaths of cities where panhandling is pro-
hibited. For example, New Orleans bans “panhandling” near a variety of 
                                                        
64  A DREAM DENIED, supra note 9, at 9 (relying on a 2006 study of 224 U.S. cities). 
65  Id. 
66  See id. at 14. 
67  See, e.g., ST. LOUIS, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 15.44.010–.020 (2008). 
68  See, e.g., id. § 15.44.020. 
69  See id. §§ 15.44.010–.020. 
70  See id. 
71  Id. § 15.44.010. 
72  Id. § 15.44.020. 
73  See id. §§ 15.44.010–.020. 
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downtown locations in addition to its citywide ban on “begging,”74 explained 
by a New Orleans lawmaker as adding “teeth” to the law.75 Other cities ban 
panhandling or begging in public parks,76 streets,77 and beaches.78 
Solicitation and panhandling laws thus have much in common. Depending 
on the city, they can apply in a traditional public forum such as city streets and 
sidewalks, or in a limited public or nonpublic forum such as airports and sub-
ways. Both can be broad or narrow, and both can include manner or context 
prohibitions against aggressive behavior. Both can create buffer zones that pro-
hibit speech around certain places, and even when the targeted location is a bus 
stop or private business, the buffer zones can extend well into public streets and 
sidewalks. Both prohibit panhandling. The difference to keep in mind, howev-
er, is that solicitation laws reach all immediate requests for money. Only pan-
handling laws target people who request charitable donations solely on behalf 
of themselves. 
II.   THE EVOLUTION OF PANHANDLING DOCTRINE 
Cities are not passing these laws in a doctrinal vacuum. Over the past sev-
eral decades, courts have confronted the First Amendment implications of a va-
riety of solicitation and panhandling laws. The Supreme Court has yet to give 
the final word on whether panhandling should receive First Amendment cover-
age,79 but it has developed a line of cases to help measure the speech interests at 
stake. This Part first traces the Court’s precedent on solicitation. It then ex-
plores the circuit split that has developed around two central questions: are so-
licitation laws content-neutral restrictions on covered speech? And if they are, 
how far can cities go in their prohibitions? 
A.   Supreme Court Guidance 
A central lesson to take from the Court’s solicitation jurisprudence is that 
the First Amendment covers requests for donations made by an array of actors, 
including charities,80 for-profit organizations and individuals acting on behalf 
of non-profits,81 and political groups.82 Scholars generally agree that these cases 
                                                        
74  NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. VI, div. 4, §§ 54-411, 54-412 (2011). 
75  Emily Lane, New Orleans Lawmaker’s Bill Banning Solicitation Cracks Down on Pan-
handlers, Prostitutes, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 30, 2014, 7:25 PM), http://www.nola.com/pol 
itics/index.ssf/2014/04/prostitution_panhandling_new_o.html [http://perma.cc/A84P-M48P]. 
76  ST. LOUIS, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 15.44.020(B)(8) (2008). 
77  See, e.g., VIRGINIA BEACH, VA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 23-15 (1979) (“It shall be unlaw-
ful . . . for any person to beg on the streets or beaches of the city.”). 
78  See, e.g., id. 
79  See Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 874 (6th Cir. 2013) (acknowledging lack of control-
ling Supreme Court precedent). 
80  See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 644 (1980). 
81  See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Sec’y of State v. 
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984). 
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logically extend to First Amendment coverage for individual panhandling to 
solicit donations on behalf of oneself.83 Equally important, however, is the 
Court’s message that solicitation, while covered under the First Amendment, 
still is subject to reasonable governmental regulation. But what is a “reasona-
ble” time, place, and manner restriction on solicitation in general, or panhan-
dling in particular? This Part lays out the Court’s solicitation precedent, while 
Part III explores what these cases mean for today’s panhandling laws. 
1.   First Amendment Coverage for Solicitation 
The Court’s solicitation jurisprudence firmly establishes the starting point 
for any First Amendment challenge to panhandling laws: charitable solicitation 
is covered speech. The leading case is Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a 
Better Environment.84 In Schaumburg, the Court considered a municipal ordi-
nance that imposed a fine on charitable organizations engaged in solicitation 
without a permit.85 To obtain a permit, organizations had to submit proof that 
75 percent of proceeds would be used directly for their charitable purposes.86 
The organization in Schaumburg, however, relied on canvassers to promote its 
environmental protection goals, and it spent more than two-thirds of collected 
funds on salaries and employee benefits.87 The Village sought to defend its or-
dinance as “deal[ing] only with solicitation” and thereby outside the scope of 
the First Amendment.88 
The Court rejected the idea that asking for money is conduct unprotected 
by the First Amendment. Recognizing that its cases have “implied that solicit-
ing funds involves interests protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of 
freedom of speech,”89 the Court concluded that “charitable appeals for funds, 
on the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech interests—
communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and 
ideas, and the advocacy of causes—that are within the protection of the First 
Amendment.”90 The Court emphatically rejected the idea that charitable solici-
tation is “purely commercial speech.”91 Rather, the Court reasoned that 
“[c]anvassers . . . are necessarily more than solicitors for money,” because their 
financial requests are “characteristically intertwined with informative and per-
haps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular 
                                                                                                                                 
82  See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
83  See supra note 2. 
84  444 U.S. 620. 
85  Id. at 624. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. at 625–26 & n.6. 
88  Id. at 628. 
89  Id. at 629. 
90  Id. at 632. 
91  Id. 
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views on economic, political, or social issues.”92 Any regulation, the Court cau-
tioned, must take account of that reality, as well as the fact that “without solici-
tation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.”93 The 
real issue, the Court continued, was “not whether charitable solicitations . . . are 
within the protections of the First Amendment”—the Court considered it “clear 
that they are”—but instead whether the Village abused its power to enact rea-
sonable regulations.94 The Court held that it did.95 
The Court reaffirmed this approach to charitable solicitation in Secretary of 
State v. Joseph H. Munson Co.96 The ordinance in question was similar to the 
one considered in Schaumburg, with the exception of allowing organizations to 
spend more than 25 percent of donations on administrative and similar costs if 
they could demonstrate financial necessity.97 The Court embraced Schaum-
burg’s characterization of charitable solicitations as “so intertwined with 
speech that they are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.”98 The 
question for these types of restrictions was not whether the law addressed cov-
ered speech, but whether the statute that “impose[d] a direct restriction on pro-
tected First Amendment activity” risked chilling that speech through imprecise 
means.99 As in Schaumburg, the Court held that it did.100 
Likewise in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 
the Court extended these protections to solicitation by individual professional 
fundraisers on behalf of charitable organizations.101 North Carolina placed dis-
closure and licensing obligations on professional fundraisers and prohibited the 
collection of excessive fees, arguing the regulations were necessary to maxim-
ize the solicited funds actually reaching charitable organizations.102 The Court 
characterized that argument as “a variation of the argument rejected in Shaum-
burg and Munson that this provision is simply an economic regulation with no 
First Amendment implication.”103 As in Munson, the Court reaffirmed that 
charitable solicitation is not “merely commercial speech” “akin to a business 
proposition.”104 The Court refused to accept that “a professional’s speech is 
necessarily commercial whenever it relates to that person’s financial motivation 
for speaking,” reasoning that even if speech abstractly has a “commercial” na-
ture, it loses that commercial character “when it is inextricably intertwined with 
                                                        
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. at 633. 
95  Id. at 633–34. 
96  Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 950 (1984). 
97  Id. at 959, 962. 
98  Id. at 959. 
99  Id. at 967–68. 
100  Id. 
101  Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781, 784 (1988). 
102  Id. at 784, 786, 789. 
103  Id. at 790. 
104  Id. at 787. 
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otherwise fully protected speech.”105 The Court was unwilling “to separate the 
component parts of charitable solicitations from the fully protected whole” to 
“parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to an-
other phrase,” an endeavor it called “artificial and impractical.”106 Instead, the 
Court held that the “regulation burdens speech, and must be considered accord-
ingly.”107  
The Court’s decision in Riley is particularly striking for its treatment of in-
dividual, for-profit professional fundraisers. While the Munson plaintiff was a 
for-profit corporation acting on behalf of a charitable organization,108 the sever-
al Riley plaintiffs included three professional solicitors, named as individuals in 
the suit.109 The Court considered it irrelevant whether the restriction was 
viewed as burdening a charity’s ability to speak through fundraisers, or burden-
ing the professional fundraisers’ own ability to speak—either way, the Court 
considered the restriction “undoubtedly one on speech” that “cannot be counte-
nanced here.”110 The Court specifically recognized “the First Amendment inter-
est of professional fundraisers in speaking,” reiterating the “well settled” prin-
ciple “that a speaker’s rights are not lost merely because compensation is 
received.”111 Moreover, the Court subjected the licensing portion of North Car-
olina’s ordinance to First Amendment scrutiny because of the burden on the in-
dividual, for-profit fundraisers.112 North Carolina claimed “a heightened inter-
est in regulating those who solicit money,” but the Court struck down the 
State’s licensing scheme on First Amendment grounds.113 
The Court has recognized that the First Amendment also covers solicitation 
on behalf of non-charitable organizations. In United States v. Kokinda, the 
Court confronted political advocacy and solicitation on federal postal property 
by volunteers for the National Democratic Policy Committee.114 A federal regu-
lation prohibited solicitation on postal premises, and the respondents were con-
victed for their solicitation of contributions on the sidewalk near the post office 
entrance.115 While the Court ultimately upheld the restriction as a reasonable 
limitation on speech,116 the plurality began by asserting that “[s]olicitation is a 
                                                        
105  Id. at 795–96. 
106  Id. at 796. 
107  Id. at 790. 
108  Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 950 (1984). 
109  See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc. v. Riley, No. 86-3998, 1987 WL 37243, at *1 
(4th Cir. Apr. 23, 1987); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc. v. Riley, 635 F. Supp. 256, 
257 (E.D.N.C. 1986). 
110  Riley, 487 U.S. at 794. 
111  Id. at 801. 
112  Id. 
113  Id. at 802. 
114  United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 723 (1990). 
115  Id. at 723–24. 
116  Id. at 731. 
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recognized form of speech protected by the First Amendment,”117 and Justice 
Kennedy concurred that the regulation survived as a “content-neutral time, 
place, or manner restriction on protected speech.”118 In Kokinda, as in Schaum-
burg, Munson, and Riley, the Court thus treated restrictions on solicitation as 
raising First Amendment questions. 
2.   First Amendment Protection in Public and Nonpublic Fora 
Since the Court has granted solicitation First Amendment coverage, the 
question becomes, what is a reasonable regulation of that speech? In Schaum-
burg, the Court made clear that “[s]oliciting financial support is undoubtedly 
subject to reasonable regulation”—provided that restrictions take account of the 
intertwined nature of financial requests and protected speech, and the reality 
that blocking solicitation would likely stem the flow of related information and 
advocacy.119 While the Court has at times upheld solicitation laws as reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions, particularly in a limited public or nonpub-
lic forum, it often strikes them down as overbroad when they restrict speech on 
public streets. 
Consider first a series of cases striking down solicitation laws intended to 
prevent fraud when they restricted speech in public areas that had traditionally 
been places of public discourse. In Schaumburg, the Village argued that permit-
ting solicitation only by organizations that used at least 75 percent of donations 
for direct charitable purposes was necessary to prevent fraud.120 The Court rec-
ognized the Village’s “substantial” interest at hand, but reasoned that the ordi-
nance also restricted the speech of research, advocacy, and public education or-
ganizations that use paid staff to achieve their goals.121 Those organizations 
often spend more than 25 percent of donations on salaries but are not truly en-
gaged in “fraudulent” activities.122 The Court held that the Village may not 
“lump such organizations with those that in fact are using the charitable label as 
a cloak for profitmaking and refuse to employ more precise measures to sepa-
rate one kind from the other.”123 Instead, the Court limited the Village to draw-
ing narrower regulations, such as direct prohibitions on fraudulent misrepresen-
tations, that would not “unnecessarily interfer[e] with First Amendment 
freedoms.”124 “If it is said that these means are less efficient and convenient” 
than broadly banning solicitation, the Court concluded, “the answer is that con-
                                                        
117  Id. at 725. 
118  See id. at 740 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (characterizing Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion). 
119  Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). 
120  Id. at 636. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. at 636–37 & n.10. 
123  Id. at 637. 
124  Id. 
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siderations of this sort do not empower a municipality to abridge freedom of 
speech and press.”125  
The Court reaffirmed this approach in its later charitable solicitation cases. 
In Munson, the Court struck down on its face a similarly overbroad ban, also 
justified by the State on grounds of combatting fraud, when “the means chosen 
to accomplish the State’s objectives [we]re too imprecise.”126 Again in Riley, 
the Court rejected the State’s regulation as “in sharp conflict with the First 
Amendment’s command that government regulation of speech must be meas-
ured in minimums, not maximums.”127 Even the risk of a mistaken application 
of the law, the Court reasoned, “necessarily chill[s] speech in direct contraven-
tion of the First Amendment’s dictates.”128 Once again, the Court concluded 
that even if enforcing antifraud laws is not “the most efficient means of pre-
venting fraud, we reaffirm simply and emphatically that the First Amendment 
does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency.”129 
In contrast, the Court has upheld bans on solicitation in other contexts. 
While no rationale commanded a majority of the Court in Kokinda, the Court 
upheld a ban on solicitation on a sidewalk outside a postal office.130 In his con-
currence, Justice Kennedy viewed the law as a reasonable time, place, and 
manner restriction of protected expression.131 While the plurality reasoned that 
the sidewalk was not a traditional public forum,132 Justice Kennedy declined to 
characterize the sidewalk, instead deferring to the Postal Service’s conclusion 
that restricting solicitation was warranted for facilitating postal transactions, the 
purpose to which the government had dedicated the property.133 He concluded 
that the regulation survived because it was “narrow in its purpose, design, and 
effect,” did not “discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint,” was “nar-
rowly drawn to serve an important governmental interest,” and permitted alter-
native expressive conduct.134 
In two similar cases, the Court likewise upheld solicitation laws in a lim-
ited public or nonpublic forum. Both involved solicitation by a religious non-
profit organization, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness 
(ISKCON), on government-owned property. In one case, the Court upheld a 
regulation that allowed solicitation only in designated areas of state fairgrounds 
as a valid time, place, and manner restriction, considering the rule to be content 
neutral because it applied even-handedly to “all who wish . . . to solicit 
                                                        
125  Id. at 639 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939)). 
126  Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 949, 966, 968 (1984). 
127  Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 790 (1988). 
128  Id. at 794. 
129  Id. at 795. 
130  See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
131  Id. at 738 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
132  Id. at 727 (plurality opinion). 
133  Id. at 738–39 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
134  Id. at 739. 
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funds.”135 The Court sharply contrasted fairgrounds to public streets, reasoning 
that while the latter have historically “been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions,” 
fairgrounds are a limited public forum.136  
A decade later, the Court again upheld an ordinance against a challenge by 
ISKCON, this time regarding a ban on all solicitation inside an airport termi-
nal.137 As before, the Court distinguished between laws that restrict “speech on 
government property that has traditionally been available for public expres-
sion,” which are “subject to the highest scrutiny,” and those that regulate 
speech in a limited public or nonpublic forum.138 Because the Court considered 
an airport terminal to be a nonpublic forum, it asked only whether the regula-
tion was reasonable, and concluded it was.139 
B.   The Circuit Split on First Amendment Protections for Panhandling 
Federal courts of appeals have been grappling with how to apply the 
Court’s guidance on solicitation to panhandling, particularly for restrictions in a 
traditional public forum. As outlined in Part I, solicitation and panhandling 
laws take a variety of forms. Lower courts have struggled with how to apply 
the Court’s precedent to laws that vary in scope. Every court of appeals to 
reach the question has held that panhandling is speech or expressive conduct 
covered by the First Amendment,140 and not one has treated panhandling as 
outside the First Amendment’s reach.141 While the Second Circuit once sug-
gested panhandling is not covered speech,142 it has since recognized that “beg-
ging constitutes communicative activity” and struck down a citywide panhan-
                                                        
135  Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648–49 (1981). 
136  Id. at 651, 655 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
137  See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 675–76 (1992). 
138  Id. at 678–79. 
139  Id. at 683, 685. 
140  See Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222, 225 (4th Cir. 2015); Thayer v. City of Worces-
ter, 755 F.3d 60, 71 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015); Speet v. 
Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 2013); Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 
549, 555 (4th Cir. 2013); Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 
1999); Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993); see also ACLU of 
Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 788, 792–93 (9th Cir. 2006) (reiterating that “solic-
itation is a form of expression entitled to the same constitutional protections as traditional 
speech” in a challenge against a law that prohibited “beg[ging], solicit[ing] or plead[ing] . . . 
for the purpose of obtaining money . . . for oneself or another person or organization” in cer-
tain public areas of the city (alterations in original)). 
141  See Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that the par-
ties agreed that “panhandling is a form of speech, to which the First Amendment applies”), 
on reh’g, 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015); Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 
2000) (“[A]ssuming for the purposes of this appeal that some panhandler speech would be 
protected by the First Amendment . . . .”). 
142  Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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dling ban in New York City.143 The real disagreement has been over what pro-
tections to afford that speech. A circuit split has begun to emerge around two 
central questions: (1) are solicitation laws content neutral? And if they are, (2) 
which laws are valid time, place, and manner regulations, and which are not? 
1.   Are Solicitation Laws Content Based or Content Neutral? 
First, a quick overview of content discrimination: A law is content neutral 
if it is “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,”144 
while a law is content based if it is “adopted . . . because of disagreement with 
the message” that the speech conveys.145 If a law’s purpose is to suppress or 
approve certain content, or if it facially discriminates based on content, the law 
is content based.146 The categorization matters because content neutrality de-
termines how high the hurdle is for the government to prevail. To ban speech in 
a traditional public forum, a content-neutral law need only be narrowly tailored 
to meet a significant governmental interest and allow for alternative channels of 
communication.147 In contrast, a content-based law will be subject to strict scru-
tiny, and it will survive only if the law is the least restrictive means to achieve a 
compelling governmental interest.148  
The first real division among the circuits is whether solicitation laws are 
content based or content neutral. A central sticking point has been over the dif-
ference between solicitation and panhandling laws identified in Part I: solicita-
tion laws ban all types of solicitation, while panhandling laws target only one 
type. Does that difference mean that solicitation laws are content neutral? The 
First149 and D.C. Circuit150 say yes.151 The First Circuit, for example, reasoned 
                                                        
143  Loper, 999 F.2d at 704, 708. 
144  McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014) (quoting Renton v. Playtime Thea-
ters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)). 
145  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). The Court’s recent decision in 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), has generated significant controversy be-
cause it may have effected a radical departure from this test. See Adam Liptak, Court’s Free-
Speech Expansion Has Far-Reaching Consequences, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/courts-free-speech-expansion-has-far-
reaching-consequences.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/AK95-4VQH]. In Reed, the Court held 
that a law is content based if it “applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or 
the idea or message expressed.” Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227. If taken literally, this would make 
significantly more laws content based than would be under Ward, which focused on the gov-
ernment’s reason for adopting the regulation. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. It remains to be 
seen whether Reed will be interpreted to dramatically shift First Amendment law on content 
discrimination. This Article argues, however, that solicitation laws in traditional public fora 
fail even if they are content neutral. Accordingly, no matter how much import Reed is inter-
preted to have, it only undermines these laws further. 
146  See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429–30 (1993). 
147  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2535 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 799). 
148  See id. at 2530 (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 
(2000)). 
149  See Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 70 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded, 
135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015). 
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that the solicitation ordinance of Worcester, Massachusetts, was content neutral 
in part because “Girl Scout cookie sellers and Salvation Army bell-ringers are 
as much subject to the Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance as the homeless 
panhandler.”152 The D.C. Circuit likewise has held that bans on all immediate 
requests for donations are content neutral.153  
In contrast, the Ninth154 and Seventh Circuits155 say no. The Ninth Circuit 
found a law to be content based when it prohibited begging, soliciting, or 
pleading, because it prohibited the distribution of handbills requesting money 
but not the distribution of handbills saying other things.156 Similarly, while the 
Seventh Circuit initially considered a solicitation law to be content neutral, it 
reversed course in light of the Court’s recent decision in Reed v. Town of Gil-
bert.157 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit suggested that a similar ordinance was 
content based, but refrained from deciding the issue because of an underdevel-
oped record.158 The court reasoned that prohibiting immediate requests for do-
nations—even if extended to donations for any purpose—discriminates among 
types of solicitation by permitting requests for future donations or signatures.159 
There is no disagreement over more targeted panhandling laws. The only 
two circuits to consider panhandling-specific laws concluded they were content 
based.160 The Sixth Circuit overturned Michigan’s panhandling statute in part 
                                                                                                                                 
150  See ISKON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
151  See also Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222, 225–26, 231 & n.1 (4th Cir. 2015) (as-
suming content neutrality and reasoning that a law was not narrowly tailored after McCullen 
when it banned soliciting contributions from drivers by prohibiting all solicitation by people 
standing on streets and medians); Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 905–06 (7th Cir. 
2000) (recognizing colorable arguments on either side but not deciding because the parties 
agreed the regulations were content neutral); Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 
955–56 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) (analyzing the law as content neutral without reaching the 
question). 
152  Thayer, 755 F.3d at 70. 
153  Kennedy, 61 F.3d at 954–55; see also Gresham, 225 F.3d at 905–06 (recognizing colora-
ble arguments on either side but not deciding because the parties agreed the regulations were 
content neutral); Smith, 177 F.3d at 955–56 & n.1 (analyzing the law as content neutral 
without reaching the question). 
154  See ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 794 (9th Cir. 2006). 
155  See Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 411–13 (7th Cir. 2015). 
156  ACLU, 466 F.3d at 794. 
157  Norton, 806 F.3d at 411–13 (holding that Reed “requires” a finding of content discrimi-
nation because Reed stated that “regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to par-
ticular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed” (quoting 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015))); see also discussion supra n.145. 
158  Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2013). 
159  Id. 
160  The Eleventh Circuit upheld a challenge to a law that prohibited soliciting, begging, and 
panhandling, terms that the court stated were “interchangeable.” This suggests that the law in 
question may have targeted panhandling specifically, as opposed to other forms of solicita-
tion. The plaintiffs did not argue, however, that the law was content based. Accordingly, the 
court analyzed the law as content neutral without reaching the issue. See Smith v. City of 
Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 955–56 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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because it prohibited some types of solicitation while allowing others, a distinc-
tion it characterized as “based on content.”161 The panel did not engage in a 
lengthy analysis of content neutrality, however, and focused instead on the fact 
that the statute, which prohibited begging anywhere in public, “simply bans an 
entire category of activity that the First Amendment protects.”162 The Second 
Circuit similarly struck down a ban on “begging” throughout New York City, 
reasoning that it was “not content neutral because it prohibits all speech related 
to begging.”163 
2.   Which Laws Are Valid Time, Place, and Manner Regulations? 
Solicitation or panhandling laws that courts of appeals consider content 
discriminatory have been struck down every time.164 If courts find or assume 
them to be content neutral, however, the disagreement has been whether the 
government can validly restrict panhandling in a traditional public forum. The 
courts of appeals are split on this question. No court has invalidated such laws, 
however, when applied in a limited public or nonpublic forum.165 
On one side of the divide, the Fourth and D.C. Circuits have struck down 
content-neutral solicitation laws that restricted speech in traditional public fora. 
The Fourth Circuit, for example, invalidated an ordinance that prohibited solici-
tation on public streets and medians. While the law furthered a significant gov-
ernmental interest in traffic safety, the court reasoned that the law was invalid 
for the same reason as the buffer zones in McCullen: the law was overbroad be-
cause it prohibited all roadside solicitation, whether or not the specific activity 
was, in fact, dangerous.166 The D.C. Circuit likewise held that a solicitation law 
could not be applied to prevent solicitation within a restricted permit area of the 
National Mall.167 
                                                        
161  Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 2013). 
162  Id. at 879. 
163  Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1993). 
164  See Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 412–13 (7th Cir. 2015); Speet, 726 F.3d 
at 870, 880; ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 794 (9th Cir. 2006); Loper 
999 F.2d at 705; see also Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d at 558 (remanding to the district court be-
cause of an underdeveloped factual record regarding the city’s “censorial purpose” and rea-
soning “the complaint plausibly alleges that the City enacted the Ordinance with a censorial 
purpose and in violation of the First Amendment”). 
165  See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness of Cal., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 764 
F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding a ban on solicitation in LAX when the parties 
agreed that the law was content neutral and the ban applied in a nonpublic forum); Young v. 
N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 161 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding panhandling ban in New 
York City subway and noting that the subway is not a traditional public forum). 
166  Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222, 231 (4th Cir. 2015). 
167  ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 954–56 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting, 
however, that the court’s decision “does not require the Park Service to let rampant panhan-
dling go unchecked”). 
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On the other side, the First,168 Seventh,169 and Eleventh Circuits170 have up-
held content-neutral solicitation laws in traditional public fora. The First Circuit 
upheld a law creating buffer zones around bus stops and other areas because the 
law was not substantially overbroad.171 The Seventh Circuit upheld a similar 
ordinance that prohibited solicitation at bus stops, parked or stopped vehicles, 
sidewalk cafes, in public transportation vehicles and facilities, within twenty 
feet of ATMs and bank entrances, and after dark. The parties agreed the law 
was content neutral, and the court considered the designated places and times to 
be “where citizens naturally would feel most insecure in their surroundings.” 172 
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit upheld Fort Lauderdale’s solicitation ban that 
reached public beaches and sidewalks, citing the city’s interests in promoting 
tourism and creating a “safe, pleasant environment” on the beach.173 
If and when the Court takes a panhandling case, it is likely to address one 
or both of the questions that have divided courts of appeals: (1) are solicitation 
ordinances content neutral? And if they are, (2) can cities ban solicitation by 
panhandlers in a traditional public forum? 
III.   PANHANDLING BUFFER ZONES AFTER MCCULLEN V. COAKLEY 
McCullen provides a roadmap for how to start thinking about the questions 
that have divided courts of appeals. The first step is to ask whether the First 
Amendment covers panhandling. If panhandling is simply commercial conduct, 
for example, panhandling laws do not create First Amendment questions at all. 
If the First Amendment covers panhandling, the next question is whether solici-
tation and panhandling laws discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint, 
which determines how high the government’s hurdle will be. The most difficult 
question is the last: If at least some of these laws are content neutral, are they 
valid time, place, and manner regulations, even if they restrict panhandling in a 
traditional public forum? What about in a limited public or nonpublic forum, or 
where there is a captive audience?  
Following the Court’s precedent, the best answers are that the First 
Amendment covers panhandling, and laws that target panhandling are imper-
missible whether applied in a public, limited public, or nonpublic forum be-
cause they discriminate on the basis of content and viewpoint. Even if some 
laws are content neutral, however—and general solicitation ordinances may 
                                                        
168  See Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 73 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded, 
135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015). 
169  See Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2000). But see Norton, 806 
F.3d at 411–13 (striking down a solicitation law because it was content discriminatory after 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015)). 
170  See Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956–57 (11th Cir. 1999). 
171  Thayer, 755 F.3d at 73. 
172  Gresham, 225 F.3d at 901, 906. But see Norton, 806 F.3d at 411–13 (striking down a so-
licitation law because it was content discriminatory after Reed, 135 S. Ct. 2218). 
173  Smith, 177 F.3d at 956–57. 
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be—they cannot extend to most traditional public fora after McCullen. Else-
where, they likely survive. 
A.   Does the First Amendment Cover Panhandling? 
The starting question is whether the First Amendment covers panhandling. 
If it does not, the discussion ends there. The Court has held repeatedly that 
charitable solicitation is covered speech, but it has yet to decide whether pan-
handling is similarly covered. This is largely well-trodden ground. The consen-
sus among academics174 and federal courts of appeals175 is that panhandling is 
covered speech, and everything the Court has said about charitable solicitation 
supports First Amendment coverage.176 The purpose of this Part is not to rehash 
coverage arguments that have been thoroughly explored in the literature, but 
instead to provide a starting point and framing for the protection debate that the 
Court’s recent decisions have changed.  
As scholars have argued, panhandling serves the First Amendment’s tradi-
tional values of enlightenment, democratic governance, and self-realization.177 
To the extent the purpose of protecting speech is to promote a marketplace of 
ideas and search for truth within communities, panhandlers expose their fellow 
citizens to the dimensions of their need and the conditions of poverty in socie-
ty.178 That exposure further advances the First Amendment’s second goal of 
promoting democratic governance by giving people a better understanding of 
the social issues that public policy is meant to address.179 Indeed, studies have 
found that receiving a face-to-face request for money increases that person’s 
support for the right to panhandle and leads the listener to consider homeless-
ness a greater burden on the community.180 Finally, protecting a panhandler’s 
right to solicit alms furthers her own “individual dignity and choice” by allow-
ing her the right of free expression.181 This particular expression can be a core 
facet of autonomy and central to personal liberty for those who panhandle.182 
While some argue that panhandling is conduct outside the First Amend-
ment’s scope or that panhandling is entitled to lesser protection as purely com-
                                                        
174  See supra note 2. 
175  See supra notes 140–41. 
176  See, e.g., Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959 (1984) 
(“[C]haritable solicitations are so intertwined with speech that they are entitled to the protec-
tions of the First Amendment.” (citing Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
444 U.S. 620 (1980))). 
177  See, e.g., Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 2, at 898–904. 
178  See id. at 896–901. 
179  Id. at 901–02. 
180  Barrett A. Lee & Chad R. Farrell, Buddy, Can You Spare a Dime? Homelessness, Pan-
handling, and the Public, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 299, 315–16 (2003). 
181  See, e.g., Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 2, at 903. 
182  See, e.g., Munzer, supra note 2, at 8–12. 
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mercial speech,183 those arguments run head-on into the Court’s charitable so-
licitation precedent. Panhandling fits squarely within the Court’s decisions in 
Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley. In Schaumburg, the Court recognized that 
charitable solicitation has commercial aspects, but it considered them to be so 
intertwined with noncommercial components that it protected the entirety of the 
speech. Like organized charitable solicitors, panhandlers are “necessarily more 
than solicitors for money,” because their pleas are “characteristically inter-
twined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for par-
ticular causes or particular views on economic, political, or social issues.”184 
When a panhandler requests a donation, he necessarily communicates infor-
mation about social conditions and implicitly advocates for greater public atten-
tion to poverty. As in Schaumburg, the “flow of such information and advocacy 
would likely cease” if the panhandler were forbidden from requesting dona-
tions.185 
Consider what it would mean for the First Amendment to cover charitable 
solicitation by organizations but not panhandling. Imagine an organization that 
runs a soup kitchen in Manhattan, where Sally volunteers on weekends. The 
soup kitchen is low on funds, so Sally spends Saturday soliciting contributions 
from passersby in Times Square. Because of those donations, she is able to 
keep the soup kitchen running, and the people who donated to the organization 
learned more from her about the conditions of poverty in New York. Schaum-
burg stands for the proposition that the First Amendment covers her solicitation 
on behalf of the soup kitchen. 
Now imagine Jim is a beneficiary of the soup kitchen, and he eats lunch 
there every day. Because of low funds, however, the soup kitchen has to change 
its hours and stop serving lunch on Mondays. Would it make sense for the First 
Amendment to cover Sally’s solicitation, but not Jim’s request for alms on 
Mondays, on the one day a week the soup kitchen is closed? If there is a consti-
tutional difference between panhandling and charitable solicitation on behalf of 
organizations, the First Amendment would cover a soup kitchen’s request for 
money to buy food for the poor, while excluding a panhandler’s request for 
money to buy food for himself. 
Now imagine a different case. Suppose Jim is still a beneficiary of the soup 
kitchen, but he also wants to give back by volunteering for their fundraising ef-
forts. Now Jim’s solicitation on behalf of the soup kitchen is covered speech, 
for the same reasons as Sally’s. When Jim gives the money he solicits to the 
soup kitchen, it uses that money to buy food, and it gives that food to him. Jim 
has solicited contributions that directly benefit him. Is there a constitutional dif-
ference between Jim soliciting funds to be used by an organization for his bene-
                                                        
183  See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note, 51 at 1229–31; Teir, supra note 2, at 328–30. 
184  See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). 
185  Id. 
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fit, and him bypassing an organized intermediary to spend those funds for him-
self at the grocery store? Should there be? 
The main differences between charitable solicitation on behalf of organiza-
tions and charitable solicitation by individuals on behalf of themselves are that 
the latter is more direct and can be more emotionally powerful. Whereas organ-
izations often solicit money for the purpose of providing assistance to people, 
panhandlers directly solicit those same contributions for themselves. There is 
no principled distinction to draw between the two for First Amendment purpos-
es. If anything, the Court has suggested that when the form of “face-to-face” 
solicitation creates “a greater opportunity for the exchange of ideas and the 
propagation of views,” it is entitled to more First Amendment protection, not 
less.186 Organized charitable groups may ask for donations in ways that sanitize 
poverty and cause the listener to feel less uncomfortable than he would if di-
rectly confronted with severe need, but that difference in emotive impact can-
not be what distinguishes covered from uncovered speech.187 
B.   Do Solicitation or Panhandling Laws Discriminate 
on the Basis of Content or Viewpoint? 
The First Amendment covers panhandling, but it is without doubt subject 
to reasonable regulation.188 What, however, counts as reasonable? The answer 
depends in part on the combination of where these laws apply and whether they 
discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint. This Part argues that the crit-
ical difference between solicitation and panhandling laws is that the former are 
content neutral, while the latter discriminate on the basis of content and view-
point. This will carry different implications depending on whether the law ap-
plies in a traditional public forum, a limited public forum, or a nonpublic form. 
A full forum analysis is not necessary here—core disagreements are not about 
how to categorize the relevant fora, and the analysis of content and viewpoint 
discrimination will show that it is unnecessary to disaggregate limited public 
from nonpublic fora189—but the basic framework is helpful for knowing why 
and how content and viewpoint discrimination matter. The next Part argues that 
after McCullen, these laws fail, whether content neutral or not, when applied in 
a traditional public forum. Viewpoint discrimination will be determinative, 
                                                        
186  See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 798–99 (1985). 
187  See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 189, 207 (1983) (“[T]he government ordinarily may not restrict speech because of its 
communicative impact—that is, because of ‘a fear of how people will react to what the 
speaker is saying.’ ” (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 111 (1980))). 
188  See Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632. 
189  Additionally, Rosenberger laws face the same test for reasonableness in limited public 
and nonpublic fora, and content-neutral solicitation laws will face the same standard of re-
view in either case. See Note, Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2140, 
2147–48 (2009). 
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however, when considering the application of these laws in a limited public or 
nonpublic forum. 
It is “axiomatic” that the substantive content of speech or the message it 
conveys cannot be the basis for governmental regulation in a traditional public 
forum.190 There, content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny and survive 
only if they are the “least restrictive” or least intrusive way to serve the gov-
ernment’s compelling interests.191 Laws that discriminate against speech on the 
basis of its content or message are presumed to be unconstitutional.192 Those 
that discriminate on the basis of a speaker’s viewpoint, an “egregious” form of 
content discrimination, are even more suspect as “censorship in its purest 
form.”193  
The government faces different limitations when it regulates speech in a 
limited public or nonpublic forum. These are places that are not generally open 
to the public for First Amendment activity.194 There, the government can ex-
clude a speaker or discriminate on the basis of subject matter, so long as it is 
“reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.”195 The government 
thus may exclude a class of speakers from a limited public or nonpublic forum 
if doing so “preserves the purposes of that limited forum.”196 What it still may 
not do, however, is exclude speakers because of the particular views they 
take.197 The Court almost always strikes down viewpoint-based regulations, no 
matter where they apply.198 
Part II introduced the distinction between content-neutral and content-
based laws. As McCullen clarified, the central question to ask when evaluating 
content neutrality is whether a law is “justified without reference to the content 
of the regulated speech.”199 A law is content based if it facially discriminates on 
the basis of content, or if its purpose is to suppress or approve certain con-
                                                        
190  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (citing Po-
lice Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)). 
191  See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529–30 (2014) (citing United States v. Play-
boy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)). 
192  Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 
641–43 (1994)). 
193  See id. at 828–29 (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)); Perry Educ. 
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
194  Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998). 
195  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804–06 (1985). 
196  Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828–30. 
197  Id. 
198  Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 444 (1996). 
199  McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014) (quoting Renton v. Playtime Thea-
ters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)). The Court went even further in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), when it wrote that “regulation of speech is content based if a law 
applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” 
Id. at 2227. 
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tent.200 Practically, facial discrimination is where a legal violation depends on 
what has been said, and it requires “ ‘enforcement authorities’ to ‘examine the 
content of the message that is conveyed to determine whether’ a violation has 
occurred.”201 A law is also content based if it is “concerned with undesirable 
effects that arise from ‘the direct impact of speech on its audience’ or 
‘[l]isteners’ reactions to speech,’ ” such as speech that is prohibited for causing 
offense or making listeners “uncomfortable.”202  
Viewpoint discrimination is different. Rather than just exclude particular 
speakers or distinguish certain subject matter, a law that discriminates on the 
basis of viewpoint “intend[s] to discourage one viewpoint and advance anoth-
er.”203 The line between viewpoint-based restrictions and other content-based 
restrictions is at times fuzzy, but the difference is generally between, for exam-
ple, restricting political advertisements on billboards (subject-matter based) and 
restricting political advertisements supporting Democrats (viewpoint based).204 
Even in a nonpublic or lesser public forum, a speaker’s viewpoint cannot be the 
basis for exclusion. “[T]he government violates the First Amendment when it 
denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on 
an otherwise includible subject.”205 Once the government allows a class of 
speech in the forum, it cannot single out and exclude particular speech within 
that otherwise permitted class on the basis of the “specific motivating ideology 
or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.”206 While the government can reg-
ulate “mode[s] of expression,” it cannot proscribe communication of certain 
messages while allowing others of the same type: “Selectivity of this sort cre-
ates the possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the expression of particu-
lar ideas.”207 
1.   Solicitation Laws 
There is an intuitive appeal to concluding that all solicitation laws, whether 
targeted at panhandling or not, discriminate on the basis of content. Some 
scholars and judges have taken this view.208 To know whether someone has 
                                                        
200  See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429–30 (1993). 
201  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2531 (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 
U.S. 364, 383 (1984)); see Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 429–30. 
202  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2531–32 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). 
203  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983). 
204  Kagan, supra note 200. 
205  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). 
206  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–30 (1995). 
207  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393–94 (1992). 
208  See Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that a solic-
itation ordinance was content based because it “regulates ‘because of the topic discussed’ ” 
(quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015))); ACLU of Nev. v. City of 
Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 794 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a solicitation ordinance is content 
based because it prohibits distributing handbills that request donations but does not prohibit 
distributing those that say other things); Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 2, at 906. 
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violated a solicitation ordinance, the enforcement authorities must ask whether 
there was a request for money. They must “examine the content” of the solici-
tor’s message to know whether any solicitation took place.209 Particularly when 
solicitation laws prohibit only “immediate” requests for money, as many do, a 
person who asks a stranger for an immediate donation would violate the law, 
while a person who asks for something else—perhaps directions, or a future 
donation—would not. Violations, therefore, facially hinge on the content of 
what was said. There is no way to know whether a violation has taken place 
without examining the words that were spoken and the message that was con-
veyed. 
Moreover, legislatures sometimes justify solicitation laws for content dis-
criminatory reasons. A law is content based, for example, if it restricts speech 
because that speech makes listeners uncomfortable.210 Legislatures commonly 
explain their laws as intended to prevent “fear,” particularly the fear of becom-
ing a victim of crime, which they say people feel more often when solicited 
near certain places.211 Cities also speak of the importance of creating a “pleas-
ant environment” conducive to tourism and business in downtown districts.212 
Because those justifications for prohibiting certain content turn on the emotion-
al reactions of listeners—the “direct impact of speech on its audience”—it 
would seem those laws are content based.213 
Although it is certainly possible that the Court would consider all solicita-
tion laws to be content-based restrictions on covered speech, its solicitation ju-
risprudence has not gone that far.214 The Court has said that charitable solicita-
                                                        
209  See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014) (quoting FCC v. League of 
Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984)). 
210  Id. at 2532. 
211  See SPRINGFIELD, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. I, § 78-2(a)(1) (2014) (“This section is 
intended to protect citizens from the fear and intimidation accompanying certain kinds of 
solicitation . . . [where there is] enhanced fear of crime . . . [and] an implicit threat to both 
persons and property.”); ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-2-28(B) (2004); 
AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-4-13(A) (2005). 
212  See, e.g., MADISON, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 24.12(1) (2012). 
213  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2531–32 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). 
214  This may change after the Court’s recent decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 
2218 (2015). In Reed, the Court concluded that a sign regulation was content based because 
it applied to “particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message ex-
pressed,” reasoning that a speech regulation is content based if “on its face” it “draws dis-
tinctions based on the message” or defines “regulated speech by its function or purpose.” Id. 
at 2227 (quoting in part Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011)). The 
Court reiterated that laws are content based if they “cannot be ‘justified without reference to 
the content of the regulated speech.’ ” Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781, 791 (1989)). Some commentators believe this decision may dramatically reduce the 
government’s ability to regulate speech. See Adam Liptak, supra note 145. Moreover, the 
Seventh Circuit has reversed its reasoning on the content neutrality of solicitation ordinances 
because of Reed. See Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 411 (7th Cir. 2015). To 
date, however, the Court has not expressly changed its approach to solicitation, and it re-
mains to be seen what import Reed will have for content discrimination more broadly. In any 
case, this Article argues that solicitation laws fail when applied in traditional public fora 
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tion is subject to reasonable regulation,215 and it has considered general solicita-
tion laws to be content neutral.216 If they were considered content based simply 
because an enforcement agency must determine whether there was a request for 
money, it would be difficult to understand the standard that the Court has ap-
plied to these laws.217 It has asked whether solicitation laws are valid time, 
place, and manner restrictions on speech, and it has considered the absence of a 
narrowly tailored law or a substantial governmental interest sufficient to strike 
them down. In Schaumburg, the Court invalidated a law not because it failed to 
meet a “compelling” governmental interest through the least restrictive means 
available, but because the government’s “substantial” interests “could be suffi-
ciently served by measures less destructive of First Amendment interests.”218 
This resembles the test that the Court applies to content-neutral laws. Indeed, 
content neutrality is a prerequisite to applying the entire time, place, and man-
ner test in the first place in a traditional public forum.219 
This is the right approach for laws that do not discriminate among types of 
charitable solicitation. A commercial request for money may be “intertwined” 
with core speech interests, but charitable solicitation is still its own activity. At 
times, the government may have legitimate reasons to restrict solicitation in 
certain places, just as it does for any number of activities. The central question 
for the First Amendment is how much restricting the general subject matter of 
charitable solicitation endangers the interests that the First Amendment seeks to 
protect. At its core, a driving purpose of asking whether a law is content based 
is to prevent the government from distorting public debate.220 Eliminating cer-
tain “ideas, viewpoints, or items of information from public debate” can un-
                                                                                                                                 
even if they are considered content neutral. Accordingly, Reed only makes that ultimate con-
clusion stronger. 
215  Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (“Soliciting 
financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation . . . .”). 
216  See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“It is 
the inherent nature of solicitation itself, a content-neutral ground, that the Service justifiably 
relies upon when it concludes that solicitation is disruptive of its business.”); id. at 739 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Postal Service regulation . . . does not discriminate on the 
basis of content or viewpoint . . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306–07 (1940) 
(“The state is . . . free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest 
of public safety, peace, comfort or convenience.”); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that 
Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 783, 798 (2007). 
217  In Schaumburg, the Court analyzed a solicitation law under a more deferential standard 
than it usually applies to content-based restrictions, and recognized that “[s]oliciting finan-
cial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation.” 444 U.S. at 632; see supra Part 
II.A.; see also Nat’l Fed. of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331, 338 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005) (recog-
nizing that it is unclear whether the Schaumburg test amounts to strict scrutiny or intermedi-
ate scrutiny, and noting other courts of appeals consider it to be equivalent to the regular 
time-place-and-manner standard). 
218  Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636. 
219  See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014). 
220  See Stone, supra note 189, at 198 (discussing viewpoint discrimination). 
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dermine the First Amendment’s values and purposes, but restrictions on solici-
tation, directed at an entire subject of expressive activity, present less risk of 
such distortion.221  
Treating solicitation laws as content neutral, even though they restrict 
speech on an entire subject matter, follows how the Court has occasionally 
treated other laws that require an enforcement agency to ask what has been said 
and discriminate on the basis of subject matter. For example, the Court upheld 
a law that restricted partisan political activities (including solicitation on behalf 
of a political organization) by certain State employees. Because the statute was 
not “censorial” or “directed at particular groups or viewpoints,” the Court rea-
soned that it “regulate[d] political activity in an even-handed and neutral man-
ner.”222 The Court has likewise upheld restrictions (although not applied in a 
traditional public forum) on all political advertisements in a public transit sys-
tem,223 and on politically partisan publications at a military base.224 Where there 
are legitimate reasons for the government to regulate an activity that encom-
passes an entire subject matter, and it does not single out particular viewpoints 
for favor or disfavor, the First Amendment does not and should not bar reason-
able regulation.  
Even where solicitation laws have a disproportionate effect on one group—
panhandlers—that “differential impact” does not render an otherwise neutral 
law content discriminatory.225 The Court has rejected the idea that a law is con-
tent based simply because “it systematically and predictably burdens most 
heavily those groups” with disfavored viewpoints.226 The relevant inquiry is 
whether a law “serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression,” not 
whether “it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not oth-
ers.”227 In McCullen, the Court reaffirmed that approach by finding a law to be 
content neutral even though it had the “inevitable effect” of restricting speech 
on some topics more than others.228 
Moreover, legislatures typically provide content-neutral justifications for 
solicitation regulations.229 For example, Madison, Wisconsin justifies its solici-
tation law as ensuring “unimpeded pedestrian traffic flow,” helping to combat 
alcohol abuse, protecting pedestrians’ physical safety and wellbeing, and reduc-
                                                        
221  Id. at 199, 241. 
222  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 616 (1973). 
223  See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974). 
224  See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976). 
225  Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Mar-
tinez, 561 U.S. 661, 696 (2010). 
226  Id. at 695. 
227  Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
228  McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529, 2531 (2014). 
229  See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (identifying “congestion” and “the need to 
protect . . . security” as content-neutral justifications). 
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ing harassment.230 The latter types of safety justifications are particularly com-
mon. Deerfield Beach, Florida likewise justifies its law as intended to “promote 
the health, safety and welfare of the residents and visitors,” reasoning that so-
licitation is particularly dangerous on or near public streets where drivers can 
become distracted, or where solicitation can create “crowd control prob-
lems.”231 Other common justifications are preventing fraud or economic loss to 
businesses and tourist districts.232 
This is not to suggest all general solicitation laws are content neutral. At 
times, solicitation ordinances are motivated by concerns that render them con-
tent based. As the Court stated in McCullen, speech prohibitions are content 
based if enacted because certain speech causes offense or makes listeners feel 
“uncomfortable.”233 Were Madison’s solicitation law justified only by its desire 
to create a “pleasant environment” that it considered to be undermined by solic-
itors whose requests make people feel uncomfortable, that law would be con-
tent based. It would directly target the “emotive impact” of covered speech 
without being grounded in permissible governmental objectives.234 The typical 
justifications, however—preventing traffic congestion, physical assault, fraud, 
etc.—are content neutral. 
2.   Panhandling Laws 
Panhandling laws target speech on the basis of content in a way general so-
licitation laws do not. They discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. Panhandling 
laws restrict a certain type of charitable solicitation, and their application de-
pends directly on the cause that the solicitor is advocating. The problem with 
these laws is not that they regulate interactions that involve the exchange of 
money, but rather that they distinguish between some requests and others. Even 
if a blanket prohibition on all solicitation—or even on all charitable solicita-
tion—would be content neutral when applied to panhandlers, panhandling ordi-
nances target only one type of charitable solicitation. The First Amendment 
problem is that the government allows a class of speech in the forum (charita-
ble solicitation), but it singles out and excludes particular speech (panhandling) 
within that otherwise permitted class on the basis of the speaker’s particular 
cause (her own welfare).235 When the distinction between forbidden and invited 
types depends on what the speaker says, rather than when, where, how, or to 
                                                        
230  See, e.g., MADISON, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 24.12(1) (2012); see also PITTSBURGH, 
PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 602.01 (2005) (citing traffic flow and protection from “intimi-
dation, threats, and harassment” as primary purposes); ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 12-2-28(B) (2004) (citing prevention of “fear, intimidation and disorder,” 
physical violence, and threats of harm as intent of the law). 
231  DEERFIELD BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 46-34(a) (2012). 
232  See, e.g., ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-2-28(B) (2004). 
233  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529, 2531–32. 
234  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394 (1992) (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 321). 
235  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–30 (1995). 
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whom she says it, panhandling laws are not only content based, but viewpoint 
discriminatory as well.  
To illustrate, imagine a solicitation law that facially discriminates between 
two causes. Suppose the law permits charitable solicitation on behalf of organi-
zations dedicated to environmental causes, but forbids solicitation on behalf of 
organizations that run soup kitchens or deliver other services to the poor. That 
law clearly discriminates on the basis of viewpoint because it favors certain 
opinions over others, and allows organizations to engage in First Amendment-
covered speech only if they support the government’s favored purpose. To 
prosecute violators, the enforcement agency would need to ask what the de-
fendant said, and which cause he supported.  
The panhandler is like the latter type of organization, soliciting on behalf 
of an organization with the purpose of delivering services to the poor. Panhan-
dling laws do not stop someone from asking for money on behalf of Green-
peace, but they kick in as soon as that same person asks for money on behalf of 
herself, at the same time, in the same place, in the same manner, and from the 
same listener. The primary difference between a charitable organization and a 
panhandler is that the panhandler’s chosen cause is the improvement of her 
own situation. She is advocating on behalf of herself, but that does not make 
her advocacy any less tied to a specific purpose. That same purpose would be a 
protected viewpoint if advanced by a charitable organization advocating on her 
behalf. There is no principled reason why an organization’s advocacy for her 
should be treated any differently than the individual’s exercise of that same 
right.  
Some panhandling laws are also content based because of the justifications 
that legislatures provide. For example, Kansas City, Missouri explains the pur-
pose of its law as partly to prevent the “sense of fear” created by aggressive 
panhandling, which, arising out of the emotive impact of the speech, is a con-
tent-based rationale.236 After all, a law is content based if it is “concerned with 
undesirable effects that arise from ‘the direct impact of speech on its audience’ 
or ‘[l]isteners’ reactions to speech.’ ”237 To be sure, Kansas City also cites sev-
eral content-neutral justifications, such as protection of public safety and unob-
structed traffic flow.238 Even for panhandling laws that are justified by wholly 
neutral considerations, however, their facial classifications render them view-
point discriminatory. The Court consistently rejects the idea that a facially dis-
criminatory law is content neutral just because it is justified by content-neutral 
reasons.239 
                                                        
236  See KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. I, § 50-8.5(a) (2007). 
237  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2531–32 (alteration in original) (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 321). 
238  See KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. I, § 50-8.5(a) (2007). 
239  See Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 259 (2012). 
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C.   Are Panhandling Buffer Zones Valid Time, Place, and Manner 
Restrictions? 
Laws that specifically target panhandling discriminate on the basis of con-
tent and viewpoint. Whether applied in a traditional public forum, a limited 
public forum, or a nonpublic forum, they are subject to strict scrutiny, and that 
test “nearly always proves fatal” in the First Amendment context.240 Especially 
in a traditional public forum, the government has a “very limited” ability to re-
strict speech,241 and it typically has “no power” to restrict speech there “because 
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”242 The Court has rec-
ognized that “it is all but dispositive” in the ordinary case “to conclude that a 
law is content-based and, in practice, viewpoint-discriminatory.”243 No one se-
riously contends panhandling or solicitation laws can survive strict scrutiny.244 
But what about solicitation laws that are content neutral? Their fate will 
hinge on where they prohibit solicitation. This Part argues that content-neutral 
laws banning solicitation in a traditional public forum are invalid after McCul-
len, particularly those that create large buffer zones covering public streets and 
sidewalks. In contrast, more targeted laws that prohibit solicitation in a limited 
public forum, nonpublic forum, or where there is a captive audience survive. 
1.   Traditional Public Fora 
Recently in McCullen, the Court shed new light on the extent to which 
state and local governments can create buffer zones in which they prohibit 
normally protected speech in a traditional public forum. As its starting point, 
McCullen reaffirmed the standard that the government’s content-neutral solici-
tation laws must meet. Restrictions on speech in a traditional public forum are 
valid time, place, or manner regulations only if they (1) are “justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech,” (2) are “narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant governmental interest” without burdening “substantially 
more speech than is necessary,” and (3) allow for “ample alternative channels 
for communication.”245 The narrow tailoring requirement is designed in part to 
prevent the government from suppressing speech “for mere convenience,” be-
cause when “certain speech is associated with particular problems, silencing the 
speech is sometimes the path of least resistance.”246 Despite significant gov-
                                                        
240  See id. at 237. 
241  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)). 
242  Id. (quoting Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). 
243  Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)). 
244  See, e.g., ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 792 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The 
City concedes in its briefing to our court that if the solicitation ordinance is content-based, it 
is facially invalid . . . .”). 
245  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529, 2535 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781, 791, 799 (1989)). 
246  Id. at 2534. 
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ernmental interests, the First Amendment “prevents the government from too 
readily ‘sacrific[ing] speech for efficiency.’ ”247 
In McCullen, the Court considered a law that made it a crime to stand on a 
public road or sidewalk within thirty-five feet of the entrance or driveway to 
any facility, except hospitals, where abortions are performed.248 The law ex-
cluded petitioners from public sidewalks in front of abortion clinics, where they 
wished to engage in “sidewalk counseling” and persuade women through inti-
mate conversations to forego abortions.249 The Court reasoned that the law was 
content neutral because it restricted all speech in certain areas, not just anti-
abortion viewpoints.250 The effect of the law, however, was to hamper petition-
ers’ counseling efforts, leading to fewer conversations and less leaflet distribu-
tion than before the buffer zones went into effect.251 The Court unanimously 
struck down the Massachusetts law as invalid under the Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment, despite its content neutrality.252 That decision carries pro-
found implications for how courts should think about panhandling buffer zones 
that restrict covered speech in a traditional public forum—especially for those 
who consider solicitation (or panhandling) laws to be content neutral. 
A key factor for the Court was where the law banned speech. The fact that 
the law blocked access to public streets and sidewalks—areas that “occupy a 
‘special position in terms of First Amendment protection’ because of their his-
toric role as sites for discussion and debate”—was critical.253 Public streets and 
sidewalks are where listeners encounter speech they “might otherwise tune 
out.”254 These are the traditional public fora that have historically been places 
where people are free to talk to strangers, furthering the First Amendment ideal 
“to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail.”255 Moreover, the forms of speech at issue—“normal conversation and 
leafleting on a public sidewalk”—are historically associated with sharing ide-
as.256 “Protecting people from speech they do not want to hear,” Justice Scalia 
concurred, “is not a function that the First Amendment allows the government 
to undertake in the public streets and sidewalks.”257 
The buffer zones in McCullen primarily failed because they were not nar-
rowly tailored.258 The problem with the law was not that the government lacked 
                                                        
247  Id. at 2534–35 (alterations in original) (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 
Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)). 
248  Id. at 2525. 
249  Id. at 2527. 
250  Id. at 2530–32. 
251  Id. at 2528. 
252  Id. at 2541. 
253  Id. at 2529 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983)). 
254  Id. 
255  Id. (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)). 
256  Id. at 2536. 
257  Id. at 2546 (Scalia, J., concurrence). 
258  See id. at 2537 (majority opinion). 
16 NEV. L.J. 585, BARMORE - FINAL.DOCX 4/12/16  6:04 PM 
618 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:585  
significant interests, which it clearly had in promoting public safety, healthcare 
access, and unobstructed use of public sidewalks and streets.259 The problem 
was that the law also burdened petitioners’ ability to reach the audience they 
sought to engage with, and it led them to be “far less successful” in their con-
versations.260 The buffer zones kept petitioners from engaging in sidewalk 
counseling where they wanted to on a public street, and the alternatives would 
not have allowed them to communicate how and with whom they desired. The 
government could directly regulate the behavior it sought to eliminate, whether 
by criminalizing harassment, obstruction of access to facilities, or otherwise, 
but it could not “exclud[e] individuals from areas historically open for speech 
and debate” when their speech did not itself threaten those governmental inter-
ests.261 The fact that police found it difficult to enforce alternative regulations 
was insufficient. That buffer zones would make the job of police “so much eas-
ier” was “not enough to satisfy the First Amendment.”262 
McCullen signaled a significant shift in the government’s ability to enforce 
content-neutral laws that restrict speech in traditional public fora. While histor-
ically content-neutral laws were reviewed under a quite lenient version of in-
termediate scrutiny,263 McCullen raised the bar. Now, the central challenge for 
the government is to “demonstrate that alternative measures that burden sub-
stantially less speech would fail to achieve the government’s interests, not 
simply that the chosen route is easier.”264 The government will have to do more 
than simply assert that its laws are narrowly tailored to achieve significant in-
terests when they block speech on public streets and sidewalks. 
The analysis for content-neutral solicitation laws in traditional public fora 
will follow the same lines as McCullen.265 As a starting point, what is the sig-
nificant governmental interest at stake? Professor Ellickson and others have de-
tailed the harms of panhandling and other costs to cities associated with “chron-
ic street nuisances,” including costs for businesses, privacy, and race 
relations.266 Cities also have significant interests in “protect[ing] the well-being 
and tranquility of a community,”267 ensuring proper traffic flow, combatting 
fraud, preventing physical violence or harassment, and achieving other com-
                                                        
259  Id. at 2535. 
260  Id. at 2535–37. 
261  Id. at 2537–39. 
262  Id. at 2540. 
263  See Kendrick, supra note 241, at 237–38 (describing intermediate scrutiny applied to 
content-neutral laws before McCullen as “in practice a highly deferential form of review 
which virtually all laws pass”). 
264  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2540. 
265  There is even a chance the Court would consider them content based after Reed v. Town 
of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), in which case these laws would be even more vulnerable 
to attack. See supra note 216. 
266  See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 51, at 1175, 1181–83; Teir, supra note 2, at 288–90. 
267  See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949). 
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mon content-neutral goals that underlie solicitation laws.268 The real question is 
whether prohibiting solicitation on public streets, sidewalks, parks, and other 
traditional public fora is an acceptable way to achieve those goals. 
To the extent solicitation laws impose blanket restrictions on solicitation 
across entire downtown areas, they run afoul of Schaumburg, Munson, and Ri-
ley (as well as McCullen). Even supporters of panhandling ordinances admit as 
much.269 Wholesale bans on solicitation across entire cities or neighborhoods 
are not narrowly tailored to meet a substantial governmental interest because 
these laws are not tailored at all, much less narrowly. It would be simple to re-
place a few words in McCullen’s concluding paragraph to apply its lessons to 
downtown solicitation bans: 
Petitioners wish to converse with their fellow citizens about an important 
subject on the public streets and sidewalks—sites that have hosted discussions 
about the issues of the day throughout history. Respondents assert undeniably 
significant interests in maintaining public safety on those same streets and side-
walks, as well as in preserving access to adjacent healthcare facilities [business-
es, restaurants, and the like]. But here the Commonwealth has pursued those in-
terests by the extreme step of closing a substantial portion of a traditional public 
forum to all speakers [panhandlers, and other solicitors]. It has done so without 
seriously addressing the problem through alternatives that leave the forum open 
for its time-honored purposes. The Commonwealth may not do that consistent 
with the First Amendment.270 
But what about other, more narrowly tailored bans on solicitation in a tra-
ditional public forum, particularly those that create buffer zones around places 
thought to involve a high risk of coercion or intimidation? After McCullen, the 
answer is that in most cases, the government will not be able to show that these 
laws are narrowly tailored. The fit between means and ends, for each of the 
government’s justifications, is crucial—and McCullen makes clear it is not 
enough for the government simply to assert the necessity of its chosen path. Ra-
ther, the government must demonstrate that it tried less restrictive alternatives 
and that they failed to secure the interests at stake.271 
McCullen speaks most directly to a particularly pervasive justification for 
solicitation laws: combatting threatening behavior. Cities commonly assert that 
residents feel threatened when solicited in certain locations, and that solicita-
tion buffer zones around such places are necessary to prevent intimidation, har-
assment, and physical assault.272 There are differences in precisely which loca-
tions are singled out—businesses, parks, sidewalks, bus stops, ATMs, etc.—as 
well as in the distances surrounding those places that cities believe create ade-
quate buffer zones to prevent threatening behavior. The common thread, how-
                                                        
268  See Teir, supra note 2, at 288–90, 303–04. 
269  See id. at 327. 
270  McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2541 (2014). 
271  Id. at 2539. 
272  See, e.g., PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 602.01 (2005). 
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ever, is that cities believe a no-solicitation zone of some size is necessary to 
protect people from “aggressive solicitation.” 
The answer to these concerns is twofold. First, there is substantial doubt 
that solicitation is in fact threatening, even when conducted within thirty-five 
feet of bus stops or restaurant entrances. Studies question the extent to which 
panhandling typically makes people feel threatened, pointing instead to it being 
“more nuisance than threat.”273 That finding probably resonates with how the 
reader typically feels when solicited—uncomfortable, maybe a little guilty, but 
generally not threatened. Without evidence that solicitation is ordinarily harass-
ing, such assertions do not show that the law is narrowly tailored to the gov-
ernment’s desired end—an evidentiary burden that McCullen placed squarely 
with the government.274 If “aggressive solicitation” is defined to include solici-
tation in certain places that is not ordinarily aggressive in fact, the law would 
prohibit a substantial amount of speech that does not cause the harms targeted 
by the government. Accordingly, that law would not be narrowly tailored to 
achieve the government’s substantial interest.  
Second, McCullen’s answer to threatened intimidation is to regulate intim-
idating behavior directly. In McCullen, the government was concerned that 
without a buffer zone around abortion clinics, patients and staff would be har-
assed and intimidated, and argued that earlier laws failed to prevent those 
harms.275 The Court recognized the legitimacy of the governmental interests at 
stake, but it believed they could be served by criminal and civil laws against 
harassment, intimidation, assault, and the like.276 The problem with maintaining 
buffer zones was that they “unnecessarily swe[pt] in innocent individuals and 
their speech.”277 The Court left it to the government to “show[] that it seriously 
undertook to address the problem with less intrusive tools readily available to 
it.”278 Where cities have not shown serious attempts to restrict intimidating so-
licitation directly through harassment laws and similar tools, their laws will fail 
for restricting peaceful, protected solicitation in addition to harassing conduct. 
Just like harassment at abortion clinics would be easy to detect,279 so too would 
truly aggressive solicitation lend itself to the direct enforcement of harassment 
laws. 
A similar response applies to another common justification for solicitation 
laws: preventing fraud. In Schaumburg, the government defended its regulation 
                                                        
273  Lee & Farrell, supra note 182, at 318. 
274  See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2539 (rejecting the government’s argument that it had tried 
less restrictive alternatives that were unsuccessful, because the government did not identify 
past prosecutions or injunctions). 
275  Id. at 2537, 2539. 
276  Id. at 2537–38. 
277  Id. at 2538. 
278  Id. at 2539. 
279  Id. at 2540. 
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of charitable solicitation as necessary to prevent fraud.280 The Court again told 
the government that it could not indirectly regulate conduct by prohibiting 
speech, and was instead limited to prohibiting directly the behavior it wanted to 
prevent.281 The fundamental problem with the law was that in creating a uni-
form requirement to combat fraud for all organizations, it also barred certain 
forms of non-fraudulent charitable solicitation.282 The Court held that the gov-
ernment may not “lump such organizations with those that in fact are using the 
charitable label as a cloak for profitmaking and refuse to employ more precise 
measures to separate one kind from the other.”283 The government likewise 
cannot justify solicitation laws on the rationale that some panhandlers are not in 
fact homeless or poor; to lump all solicitors together because some may be act-
ing fraudulently is exactly what the Court forbade in Schaumburg. A chosen 
route being “easier” is not enough to make a law narrowly tailored.284 
For lack of narrow tailoring, solicitation laws fail regardless of whether 
they allow for ample alternative channels for speech. But if a court were to 
reach that question, McCullen again provides the answer: where “buffer 
zones . . . ma[k]e it substantially more difficult” to reach a desired audience and 
communicate as intended, it is inadequate to offer speakers an alternative forum 
down the street.285 The burden specifically on “one-on-one communication,” 
which the Court characterized as “the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps 
economical avenue of political discourse,” cannot be excused by offering 
speakers an alternative mode of communication.286  
The adequacy of the alternative forum, however, will vary by the size of 
the buffer zone in question. Blanket downtown prohibitions offer an easy case. 
Where the law prohibits solicitation across entire downtown areas, whether ex-
pressly or de facto, it will be substantially more difficult for solicitors to reach 
their intended audience by virtue of the downtown concentration of pedestrians. 
The outskirts of town are not an adequate alternative forum for someone who 
wants to reach a large audience. In addition, highly targeted prohibitions just as 
clearly provide for adequate alternatives. For example, a law that prohibits so-
licitation only within five feet of an ATM allows for adequate alternative 
means of communication. That law would designate only narrow segments of 
the city as off-limits to solicitation, leaving open equally appropriate nearby lo-
cations. Accordingly, the law’s narrow tailoring to achieve security interests, 
combined with the ability to solicit donations a few feet away, will satisfy the 
time, place, and manner test.  
                                                        
280  Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980). 
281  Id. at 636–37. 
282  Id. at 637. 
283  Id. 
284  See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2540. 
285  Id. at 2536. 
286  Id. (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988)). 
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The difficult cases are solicitation laws that cover significant swaths of 
public property but do not entirely exclude solicitors from downtown areas. For 
example, a typical law might prohibit solicitation within twenty-five feet of bus 
stops and restaurant entrances. The length of a typical block varies by city, but 
to illustrate, it is about 400 feet in Sacramento, about 525 feet in Columbus, 
and about 450 feet in Philadelphia.287 For a street with one bus stop and one 
restaurant, the buffer zone might eliminate 25 percent of the potential solicita-
tion area on that street. This probably allows for ample alternative places for 
solicitation, whether on the 75 percent of that street where solicitation is per-
mitted, or on nearby streets that do not have a bus stop or restaurant. The solici-
tor would still have access to a concentrated downtown population, and unlike 
the abortion clinic buffer zones in McCullen, there is nothing unique to the bus 
stop or restaurant location that is necessary to the message solicitors hope to 
convey. Accordingly, the real fight will center on whether these laws are nar-
rowly tailored, because the government will have little difficulty showing the 
availability of ample alternative channels for communication. 
2.   Limited Public Fora, Nonpublic Fora, and Captive Audiences 
Unlike in a traditional public forum, the government has far greater leeway 
to restrict speech in a limited public or nonpublic forum. Most types of content 
discrimination are fair game, and the government can exclude a speaker or dis-
criminate on the basis of subject matter so long as the law is “reasonable in 
light of the purpose served by the forum.”288 In this context, the Court has con-
sidered it “significant” that speakers have alternative avenues for expression.289 
One of the few boundaries on the government’s ability to regulate speech 
in a limited public or nonpublic forum is the prohibition on viewpoint discrimi-
nation. Once the government allows a class of speech in the forum, it cannot 
single out and exclude particular speech within that otherwise permitted class 
because of the “specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of 
the speaker.”290 To the extent panhandling laws are viewpoint discriminatory, 
the government can no more restrict panhandling in a limited public or nonpub-
lic forum than it can in a traditional public forum. Content-neutral solicitation 
laws, however, need only be “reasonable.”291 
General solicitation laws in a lesser public forum or nonpublic forum are 
almost certainly reasonable in light of the purposes of those fora. Such solicita-
tion laws apply most commonly in transit centers, such as subways and air-
ports, and the Court recognized in Lee that restricting airport solicitation is rea-
                                                        
287  These areas were calculated using Google Maps. See GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.goo 
gle.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2016). 
288  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). 
289  Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Mar-
tinez, 561 U.S. 661, 690 (2010). 
290  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
291  See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. 
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sonable in light of the government’s interest in ensuring orderly transit.292 Laws 
that reach bus stops likely survive for similar reasons. The Court’s permissive 
approach in Heffron to regulations in a lesser public forum likewise suggests 
that the government will have little trouble enforcing solicitation laws in either 
forum.293 
This will also be true in places where there is a captive audience. The 
Court has recognized that in situations such as public transportation where the 
audience is “there as a matter of necessity, not of choice,” the government 
“may recognize degrees of evil and adapt its legislation accordingly.”294 While 
the government cannot shut off speech unless “substantial privacy interests are 
being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner,” it can protect a “ ‘captive’ 
audience [that] cannot avoid objectionable speech.”295  
There may be gray areas for defining exactly which locations have captive 
audiences,296 but some undoubtedly involve groups who qualify. These include 
bus stops, public transportation, areas where people are waiting in line, cross-
walks, and similar places where people cannot readily avoid unwanted speech. 
A key distinction, however, is that while a bus stop itself may be a legitimate 
place to regulate solicitation, a buffer zone of thirty feet around the bus stop 
would not be. There is no equivalent doctrine that allows the government to ban 
speech in a traditional public forum simply because it is near a captive audi-
ence. 
 The following chart summarizes how to think about panhandling and solic-
itation laws, whether applied in a traditional public forum, a limited public fo-
rum, a nonpublic forum, or where there is a captive audience. Both types of 
laws prohibit panhandling, but their scope determines whether they violate the 
First Amendment.  
                                                        
292  See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 676 (1992) (up-
holding ban on solicitation in an airport terminal, a nonpublic forum). 
293  See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648–49 (1981). 
294  Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (quoting Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952) and Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 
(1932)) (upholding restriction on political advertisements on the city’s transit system). 
295  Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 541–42 (1980) 
(quoting in part Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
296  See Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 
B.U. L. REV. 939, 943–51 (2009). 
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TABLE 1: SOLICITATION AND PANHANDLING LAWS 
 
Traditional 
Public Forum 
Limited Public Forum, 
Nonpublic Forum, or 
Captive Audience 
Panhandling Laws 
(Content and Viewpoint Based) Invalid Invalid 
Solicitation Laws  
(Content Neutral) Usually Invalid Usually Valid 
CONCLUSION 
 Courts around the country will continue to grapple with panhandling laws 
until the Court weighs in and delineates the boundaries of panhandlers’ First 
Amendment rights. There is certainly no shortage of state and local laws for 
them to consider. It is fairly clear that the First Amendment covers panhan-
dling, but cases will come down to the details of how these laws are written and 
where they apply. Some broadly regulate solicitation in a content-neutral way, 
while others are viewpoint discriminatory for singling out panhandling for pro-
hibition. Wherever targeted panhandling laws apply, whether on public streets 
or subways, they violate the First Amendment because they are unnecessary to 
meet a compelling governmental interest. General solicitation laws pose a more 
difficult question. After McCullen, however, solicitation buffer zones in a tradi-
tional public forum usually will not be sufficiently tailored to meet the govern-
ment’s substantial interests in fraud and public safety. Instead, the answer is to 
target those interests directly, through antifraud and public safety statutes. In 
contrast, when applied in a limited public forum, nonpublic forum, or where 
there is a captive audience, general solicitation laws usually should survive.  
It remains to be seen whether McCullen will turn out to be just a case about 
abortion-related speech. On its face, however, the decision signals a change for 
speech regulations more broadly. The bottom line for states and municipalities 
is that McCullen likely made it more difficult for the government to create 
buffer zones that ban covered speech in a traditional public forum. Simply say-
ing that panhandling runs counter to the public interest should not, and likely 
will not, be enough. 
